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Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University

Green

11

Abstract
Switzerland has long been notorious for its acceptance of large, sometimes nefarious banking
clients. However, in a world increasingly plagued by multi-millionaire terrorist organizations,
that target large numbers of innocent civilians, Switzerland's guaranteed banking secrecy is
increasingly called into question. Terrorist financing is one area in which relatively little progress
has been made since the September 11 attacks. Terrorist financial networks continue to thrive,
funding acts of violence. In the Patriot Act, the United States gave itself increased abilities to
follow these financial transactions overseas. Yet it still does not make full use of these new
powers. This study examines the funding structure of terrorist organizations. It then assesses the
abilities of the United States to neutralize these financial assets. Finally the author assesses
whether the United States is utilizing these tools to engage its ally Switzerland in substantially
limiting or eliminating terrorist financial action within its borders.
Introduction
Terrorism funds include: "assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or
immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including
electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including by not limited to,
bank credits, travelers cheques, bank cheques, money order, shares, securities, bonds, drafts,
letters of credit. "-The International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism)
The financing of terrorism was an international concern long before the September 11 attacks.
However, the passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act, hereafter the Patriot
Act) brought the discussion of financial regulations to suppress the financing of terrorists and
terrorist acts into a sharper light. This paper ascertains how such legislation has impacted the
international banking community with a focus on the Swiss banking system.
Tracking the funds that provide terrorists with the ability to carry out their violent acts is
plagued by opaqueness, uncertainty, and a web of unconnected transactions. Terrorists who are
able to raise funds, "often commingle legitimate with illegitimate sources of funding, the
individual parts of the mix becoming not only untraceable to their source, but virtually
indistinguishable from each other." This variety of methods makes it increasingly difficult for
authorities both inside and outside of the United States to track, or follow funds as they move;
trace, to follow the path after the funds have moved; and seize funds. The Patriot Act is intended
to create an environment of amplified diligence in the controllable portions of the financing
network, namely the institutionalized banking system inside the United States and abroad.
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Methods and Means: How Terrorists are Funded
In order to understand the exact nature of the problem that the Patriot Act hopes to control, it is
necessary to understand how terrorists raise their funds. Fundraising is accomplished in myriad
ways, complicated by Islamic religious principles like Zakat. Zakat is one of the five pillars of
Islam. It requires adult Muslims of a certain wealth to donate a portion of their income to the less
privileged. This amount is carefully calculated according the Quran.' Since most faithful
Muslims donate to charities, this presents a problem. Charities may funnel this money to violent
groups and individuals. In fact, "not only may charitable organizations use their own money to
finance terrorist related activities, but they may also serve as a conduit for the transfer of money
to finance terrorist activities far afield.4" These organizations can appear quite legitimate on the
outset.'' and may, in fact be funding actual charitable works as well. In such cases, a certain
percentage of funds may be siphoned off the top, causing the majority of raised money to be
fulfilling the stated purpose of the charity, while only a small portion may be funding illicit
activities/'
Another system of terrorism financing is the hawala system. An informal banking system
used by Muslims to transfer money without going through formal institutions," hawala means
change or transform. Money is transferred via bills of exchange or promissory notes and hawala
functions primarily as a structure for remittances/ dependant on close knit, familial networks.'
The hawala is by no means the only one of its kind; similar systems also exist in South Asia and
China.lo Today, "the primary users of the hawala system are emigrants in Europe, the Persian
Gulf, and North America.'!" The Muslim banking system is especially useful for terrorists
because it leaves little trail for authorities to follow,12 because no money actually moves and the
system works incredibly quickly.
Hawala can be used to launder money in three ways: placement; layering; and
integration.l'' Placement solves the problem of large cash transfers. In many countries, reporting
requirements will draw attention to such large transfers. Hawala effectively removes this
problem, by facilitating such large cash transfers. Layering involves the movement of illicit
funds from one account to another until the funds appear legitimate. Such transfers may raise
suspicion in a well regulated banking system. The deregulated hawala allows this process to
proceed without fear of detection. Integration occurs when terrorist, "invests the money in his
legitimate assets, consumes it for pleasure, or reinvests it in illegal activities.14" Hawala allows
the funds to be easily converted from illicit funds to seemingly legitimate funds, allowing them
to be reinvested. IS
Despite the lack of a paper trail, governments still try to regulate hawala. However, "the
International Monetary Fund makes the point ... that attempts to tightly regulate an informal
financial system such as the hawala may not only change the very characteristics of the business
that has popularized it-but also may place an additional administrative burden on financial
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The United States cannot control what happens inside much of the Muslim
States sought to decrease use of the hawala system, it would need to make
banking system more competitive through decreasing service speed and
on the foreign exchange regime.

Terrorists also use feeder accounts, under names of organizations, charities, or businesses
and organizational accounts, under the names of anonymous or know trustworthy individuals.
These accounts are used to hide where money trails.
Another major method by which terrorists hide money is in commodities. Use of items
with physical value, like diamond, gold, and other gems, allows for easy smuggling across
borders. This began in late 1998, when the United States froze assets of al Qaeda and the Taliban
after the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The frozen assets caused al Qaeda to
diversify, in a sense, in order to make up for such financial vulnerabilities. Terrorists may also
counterfeit items, using profits to fund terror. In a similar plan, terrorists also use profits from tax
evasion through smuggling goods like cigarettes across U.S. state lines. In addition to the above,
terrorists can also utilize Islamic banks, diplomatic channels, and personal couriers. 17
The vast range of methods used to transfer money raised and used for terrorist operations
means that governments like the United States face serious difficulty in shutting off the funding
valve. Rather, the focus must be on putting as many roadblocks as possible in order to make
funding terrorists more difficult. The area of money laundering is the area wherein most focus is
generally placed.
History of Money Laundering Legislation in the United States
According to the Financial Action Task Force, money laundering is, "the processing
of. .. criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. 18" Most of the original legislation passed in
response to the problem of money laundering was intended to combat the problem of national
criminal issues.!" The first law passed was the Bank Security Act (BSA) in 1970, also known as
the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act?" However, this has proven difficult and
can lead to over-reporting due to the strict liability laws surrounding this type of reporting.
Additionally, this law only required reports of cash deposits of over $10,000. This led to a
phenomenon called "smurffing" in which criminals broke up their money into smaller deposits.
The regulation then was changed? I The new rules required bankers to determine suspicious
activities that must be reported, defined as transfers of monetary instruments (cash, either foreign
or domestic, and other monetary items like travelers checks) over $5,000 in a single
.
22
transaction.
However, these laws and regulations do not apply to the entire financial industry; they
only cover transactions by banks: "for instance, Western Union was required to report all

Green

14

transactions over $3,000, but unlike banks, was not required to maintain records and tracking
data.23" Further complicating the issue was the backlash against the laws based on the argument
of invasion of privacy. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the BSA was constitutional.
Yet; the backlash became the impetus for the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.24
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 specifically stated all the procedures the
government and courts must follow when requesting financial information. Such requests could
only be made through search warrants, judicial subpoena, or formal written request and the
customer in question must be notified. Only in certain specified cases is delay of customer notice
permissible. In each case, the customer in question is allowed to challenge the request. In any
obtainment of information, the possessor may not turn it over to another agency, except for
certain cases and if any transfer occurs, the customer must be notified. The only areas where
these stipulations do not apply to requests from government authorities "authorized to conduct
foreign counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities," or the secret service. In such a case,
the customer must not be notified. However, the government is required to tabulate all the
instances in which this section is used?5
The next salient act passed was The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. This act
increased the definitional strength originally provided in the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. Of
particular interest is the section that deals with extraterritorial reaches, in the cases where the act
is committed by a U.S. citizen, a non-citizen within the United States, or the value of the action
exceeds $10,000. This act amended the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 by protecting
financial institutions from being liable to the customer when providing information. The only
other point of note within the bill is the plan specified in Section 1363 for the creation of an
informational exchange system with foreign governments in the attempt to better share
information about suspected criminal activities. It further required that a study concerning
"money laundering through foreign branches of domestic financial institutions.i?"
The subject of money laundering was again addressed in legislation through the Money
Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988. This act sought to tighten the regulations
surrounding money transfers and reporting procedures. It also amended the Bank Secrecy Act,
strengthening the penalties faced by financial institutions that fail to report suspicious activity. *27
In the 1990s, two additional laws were passed. The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act was passed in 1992. Its primary purpose was to strengthen anti-money
laundering laws already in place. This law also clarified the role of nonbank financial
institutions. The majority of the law dealt with enforcement and punishment of those tried for
money laundering, specifically referring to the role of the institution (see Subtitle A: Termination
• By this time, the Bank Secrecy Act had been codified. In the 1988 act, it refers to the United States Code section
derived from the Bank Secrecy Act.
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Enforcement

Two years later, another anti-money laundering bill was passed. The Money Laundering
Suppression Act of 1994 was intended to clarify reporting activities of financial institutions. The
majority of the legislation focuses on the reporting process, with provisions to institute additional
training and to raise the financial institution's liability for not reporting suspicious activities. In
particular the law required all states to develop "uniform laws for licensing and regulating
businesses which provide check cashing, currency exchange, or money transmitting or
remittance services ... [and/or] are not depository institutions.,,29 The legislation then provided a
model statute. In addition to requiring increased reporting and uniform laws between all states,
this law also augmented the existing penalties for money laundering."
The original intent of the Bank Secrecy Act, and subsequent bills was to slow the
domestic criminal usage of money laundering. This can be inferred based both on the historical
context, wherein terrorism was not at the forefront of the United State's security concerns, and
based on the text of the legislation itself. Most of these bills focus primarily on domestic
financial institutions and customers. When foreign institutions or actions are mentioned at all it is
usually as an afterthought at the end of the bill. As can be seen from the title of the bills, there
was also a great deal of pull between the need for regulation and reporting to the proper
authorities by the banks, and the customer's right to financial privacy. In the end, regulation and
reporting clearly won out, as regulations and penalties for underreporting grew increasingly
harsher as the years progressed.
In response to the increasing regulations in the late 1990s, a proposal called, "Know Your
Customers" was presented by a number of U.S. banks. At the time, the components of the
proposal were not accepted. They subsequently have been incorporated into the measures
described in the Patriot Act. Before 2001, "banks were required to know their customer in one of
three specific situations: (1) to verify and record the name and address of the individual
presenting a transaction when a CTR filing was required; (2) when customers purchased certain
monetary instruments, such as cashier's checks and money orders; and (3) in certain wire
transfers.i'" With the passage of the Patriot Act, the variety of applicable situations was greatly
expanded and enhanced.
The USA PATRIOT Act: Changes in Legislation regarding Terrorist Financing
The Patriot Act was passed in the emotionally charged atmosphere immediately following the
9111 terrorist attacks against the United States. As a whole the Patriot Act was both comforting
and terrifying, providing the U.S. government with the powers and abilities it needed to track
down and halt terrorists while concurrently walking the edge of infringing upon the cherished
rights of the American public.
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In the area of terrorist financing, the Patriot Act expanded anti-money laundering laws to
cover more than banks32 (the primary focus of previous legislation). As a result, the same
stipulations apply to broker-dealers and investment companies. While the intention of the Patriot
Act was to improve the anti-money laundering laws, the increased paperwork required may
cause it to become less effective.33
Even more troubling than extra paperwork is the idea that financial tools provided by the
Patriot Act may not prove effective in the long term. A major problem with the Patriot Act is that
through its legislation on terrorism financing, it contains legislation that, while not directly
creating laws for foreign or international financial institutions, does create stipulations that
would make it difficult for said banks to work with u.s. banks, particularly in correspondent
accounts. Such stipulations may cause foreign banks to try side-stepping the Patriot Act
regulations, or banks may simply sever ties with u.S. banks. If such severance were to occur, it
would be similar to "cutting off financial ties with a country.i?"
As the Patriot Act provides new legislation (as opposed to amending old legislation) on
this issue, it is necessary to observe how court cases of money laundering involving this type of
financial information sharing were treated. Historically, U.S. courts required parties to produce
foreign documentation even if it violated that nation's bank secrecy laws. This sense of
international authority did not last, most likely due to refusal or inability to produce such
documentation. Today, U.S. courts must consider the following:
"the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other
information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the
information originated in the USA; the availability of alternative means of securing
the information; the extent to which non-compliance with the request would
undermine the important interests of the USA, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is
10cated.35"
After these precedents were set, two additional preconditions were also established: "personal
jurisdiction over that person or company, and their control over the documents.l?''
Within the Patriot Act, there are five sections that address the concept of U.S.
extraterritoriality in legislation: sections 311, 312, 313, 317, and 319. The first three sections
deal with regulations on domestic institutions, the last two deal more directly with foreign
.
•
.
37
institutions.
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Section 311, "Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International
Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern," deals with measures that may be enacted
by the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) against suspect institutions, accounts, or individuals.
It begins by detailing specifics from previous anti-money laundering laws (see above for a full
summary) and goes on to specify how the Secretary should determine if such special measures
should be put in place by looking at the following items: "(1) is any other nation already
pursuing this measure; (2) will these measures cause economic disadvantages in competition to
the party in question; (3) what extent the measure(s) would have on the business transactions of
the party in question; (4) the affect on the national security of the United States.3S" An
explanation on how to qualify these measures follows. Anyone dealing in international banking
may be subject to reports, special records, etc. Additionally, it may be necessary to inform the
Secretary with whom you (as the institution) are working, their legal status, and the type of
transaction being done. This is especially important for U.S. firms working with foreign
individuals or representatives of foreign individuals.
The types of accounts that are most likely to see these special measures are payablethrough accounts, and correspondent accounts. If the account is already active (in operation at
the time the Patriot Act was passed), the necessity of treating foreign customers with the same
standards as national customers in the context of knowing vital information about them, is
emphasized. For those looking to open an account, if the Secretary finds the account suspicious,
the U.S. firm may not be able to open the account. However, in order to be fair, the Secretary
must consult with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General before making such a ruling.
When observing "suspicious" firms, accounts, or individuals, the secretary must take the
following into consideration: "evidence of criminal or terrorist business transactions; the offer of
secrecy by foreign institutions; the quality of the administration and how well the administration
deals with money laundering; the volume of the transactions in respect to the economy; if the
territorial area is known for money laundering; if the United States has a mutual legal assistance
treaty, and how well the area has dealt with U.S. law enforcement in the past; and the amount of
.
39
corruption.
Despite the numerous factors of which the Secretary must be aware, the definitions of
many items are quite broad, leaving generous room for interpretation. Further, it is quite clear
that the bill singles out foreign customers and institutions for special consideration. Most likely
this was due to the lack of prior legislation specifically regarding foreign sources of money
laundering.
Section 312, "Special Due Diligence for Correspondent Accounts and Private Banking
Accounts," emphasizes the idea of due diligence in activities. Accounts in the United States for a
non-United States person, a visiting foreigner, or a representative of a non-United State person
are required to act with due diligence, in order to ascertain if the account(s) are being used for
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illicit purposes. In dealing specifically with banks possessing correspondent accounts that are
"non-cooperative" with international anti-money laundering regulations or have been designated
by the Secretary as warranting special measures shall be subject to requirements including
identification of the account holder, and "enhanced scrutiny" under the due diligence measures
described above.
Due diligence further requires minimum standards for private banks when the account
holder is a non-United States person, including, knowing the identity of the depositor and
beneficiary; enhanced scrutiny for accounts held by foreign senior politicians or their immediate
family members/associates to prevent foreign cortuption.l" Once again, this section is especially
heavy handed towards non-United States citizens and foreign institutions. All are subject to
additional scrutiny, checks, and regulations.
Section 313, "Prohibition of United States Correspondent Accounts with Foreign Shell
Banks," begins by discussing correspondence accounts." A correspondence account in this
context is, "any account established for a foreign financial institution to receive deposits from, or
to make payments or other disbursements on behalf of, the foreign financial institutions, or to
handle other financial transactions related to such foreign financial institution.42" This section
stipulates that any correspondent account where one side is located in the United States must
have a physical location for the corresponding side. The Act goes further, stating that no United
States correspondent account shared with a foreign bank should be connected, even indirectly
with a bank that has no physical presence.f In short, all accounts managed partially in the United
States must have a similarly managed and regulated institution in order for the two to be
connected via a correspondent account.
The above three sections of the Patriot Act are all domestically focused with some affects
extending to foreign account holders or institutions. It is clear that while the United States cannot
enact legislation on foreign individuals or institutions, it is willing to create stipulations that
make it difficult for such individuals or institutions to interact with U.S. institutions. Clearly,
none of the stipulations are overtly open to objection: knowing one's customers is simply a good
business policy if the institution is interested in protecting its international reputation. However,
the Patriot Act in creating difficulties for terrorists attempting to raise funds in the United States
also makes it significantly more difficult for foreign individuals and institutions to bank in the
United States. Further, the vagueness of the wording within the bill leaves the Secretary of the
Treasury with a great deal of discretion in determining what constitutes a suspicious transaction
or customer, again making it difficult for legitimate businesses and individuals to operate in the
U.S. financial market. On whole, the restrictions can be considered both comprehensive and
reasonable given the political climate during the aftermath of the September 11.
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Section 317, "Long Arm Jurisdiction Over Foreign Money Launderers," gives district
courts jurisdiction of "any foreign person, including any financial institution authorized under
the laws of a foreign country," that the United States has an interest in either the case or the
assets. The U.S. courts may seize what assets they find necessary and may appoint a Federal
Receiver to carry out the task.
Section 319, "Forfeiture of Funds in United States Interbank Accounts," is equally as
forceful as section 317. If money is deposited into a foreign account in a foreign bank that has an
interbank account with the United States, the United States assumes the funds are in the
interbank account. Then United States can pursue legal action against the foreign institution and
the funds. The U.S. Attorney General can halt this process when he sees conflict between the
national laws of the foreign state and U.S. laws ifsuch conflict causes liability.
After seizure, there is, "no requirement for [the U.S.] government to trace funds." In
short, the government does not have to prove a connection between the seized funds and the
funds deposited into the foreign bank. The owner of the funds is allowed to contest the seizure.
In some cases, this owner may be defined as the foreign bank. This is the case if: (l) the bank
was practicing the wrongdoing; (2) the foreign bank had, "discharged all or part of its obligation
to the prior owner of the funds.44"
In collecting information about the funds, the Secretary or the Attorney General can
subpoena information on correspondence accounts if one base of the account is in a foreign state
as long as the other is in the United States. Further, a bank representative may be asked to appear
if he is in the United States. If he is abroad, he still may be asked to appear if the foreign state is
under any mutual assistance treaty or other similar agreement. Any foreign bank with a
correspondence account in the United States must maintain records as though it was a U.S.
institution.
The most potent portion of this section is the one on termination requirements. U.S.
banks are required to terminate an account within ten days of a request made by the Secretary or
Attorney General. These requests are made when the foreign bank has failed to: (l) comply with
a subpoena; (2) "initiate proceedings in a United States court contesting such summons or
subpoena.Y'' In cases of termination, U.S. banks are not liable "to any person in any court or
arbitration proceeding.l'?'
These last two sections are particularly forceful in the dealings of the U.S. government
towards foreign institutions. In such cases, the United States is expanding its definition of
territorial jurisdiction, especially evident in the seizure stipulations under section 319. The
question becomes: will other states be willing to conduct business with such a tightly regulated
and broad reaching state and what happens if foreign states do not comply? Some scholars assert
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that in the end, "the USA may face the choice between cutting off access to the international
financial system and permitting access to a system that does not conform to its policies.V"
The Swiss Banking System
Switzerland is a prime case to study because of the notoriety surrounding its banking system.
The Swiss banking system is the largest sector of the Swiss economy. In 2000, Swiss banks
employed over 116,000 people and accounted for 10.5% of GDP.48 The Swiss banking system
holds over $1.2 trillion in cross border assets and the system is based on universal banking.
There are two major banks that dominate the Swiss banking industry: UBS AG and
Credit Swisse Group. Under these banks are twenty-four Cantonal, or state banks that are, "semigovernmental organizations that focus business activities on, deposits and lending?"." Beneath
Cantonal banks are regional banks who, "limit activities to particular regions of Switzerland,
thus building a competitive advantage by responding to local circumstances and regional
business cycles. 50" At an even smaller level are Raiffeisen banks, or, "local rural credit
cooperatives that raise funds locally and lend to members in their region.'!"
But it is the last bank classification of private banks that causes the most sensation.
Private banks are, "individually owned or owned in partnership ... known for discretely managing
the financial affairs of the world's wealthy and ... do not openly offer to accept savings
deposits. 52" In the popular media, Swiss banks are often portrayed in this light, and are further
given the reputation of catering to unsavory characters. For example, the criminals chased by the
popular book and film character, James Bond, generally stash their cash in a Swiss bank account,
with only a number and passcode, rather than a name, attached. This portrayal gives the
impression to the public at large that Swiss banks are engaged in an unsavory business and
commonly deal with criminals.
However, such an opaque, corrupt system is not necessarily an accurate portrayal of the
Swiss system. One of the most prominent aspects giving the Swiss banking system its poor
reputation is the numbered account. Yet, the numbered account is actually not anonymous:
"Today, when opening numbered accounts, depositors must provide the bank with the same
information as when opening regular accounts. 53" The difference between a regular account and
a numbered account is that for a number account the attached name is restricted to a certain
number of senior bank officials. In fact, some European states have more lax and secretive laws
than Switzerland.
Yet, unlike the United States, in Switzerland the right to privacy extends to banking
information. "A breach of banking confidentiality is a criminal offence, punishable by up to six
months imprisonment and/or up to CHF 50,000 in fines. 54" This confidentiality can be lifted in
cases of "serious criminal legal proceedings and most civil litigation cases. 55" Additionally,
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secrecy is lifted for other states when certain conditions are met: the investigation is pertaining to
an act also a criminal offense in Switzerland; the provided information will not be used for any
other purpose than the stated purpose; the government requesting the information agrees to
reciprocate if asked; and the "punishment" is comparable to the Swiss "punishment.i?'' Terrorism
against the United States would ostensibly meet these criteria with the possible exception of the
'punishmenr.!'
.
In fact, the success of Swiss banking is predicated on "the trust and reliability that have
been established over generations of service. 57" As a result, Switzerland cannot afford to let a
"few bad apples" spoil its system for it numerous clients.i" It can be presumed that such
assiduousness also stems from the desire to avoid negative publicity. The Swiss have two major
laws pertaining to money laundering: the Due Diligence Agreement (DDA) and the Swiss
Federal Money Laundering Act of 1998.59
Under the Money Laundering Act, Switzerland defined financial intermediary as any
person, "who professionally accepts, keeps on deposit or helps invest or transfer assets belonging
to third parties. 60" In the applying the law, financial intermediaries are required to: know the
client's identity; the beneficial owner; and form written documentation about the background of
the client and the client's funds.
Switzerland defines terrorist financing as: "the financing of a violent crime in order to
intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or
abstain from doing any act.61" Switzerland does not black list any clients because it does not
want international pressure on the creation of a list. Switzerland has created a fine line in its laws
between failing to report suspicious activity and reporting unnecessarily. In Switzerland, the
Swiss Money Laundering and Control Authority does provide a list of suspected terrorists that
actually comes directly from the U.S. government watch list. Thus it should be emphasized that
terrorists generally avoid the Swiss banking system as a platform. 62
Did the United States affect the way the Swiss banking system operates?
Contrary to popular opinion, the Swiss banking system is highly committed to anti-money
laundering efforts and has been for quite some time. According to the Swiss Bankers Association
website, "By international comparison, Switzerland's anti-money laundering measures have a
very long history.Y" Independent of the government, Swiss Banks have developed their own due
diligence codes of conduct dating back as far as 1977. These codes are written and agreed upon
by Swiss banks, and are submitted to their oversight body, the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority (FINMA), which is given the power to impose sanctions on banks for
infringement upon the codes.i"

Considering the United States would consider terrorism a capital offense, punishable by the death penalty; in
Switzerland, as in most other developed states, the death penalty is not practicedr

t
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As Swiss Banks have actively practiced anti-money laundering techniques for many
years, it is difficult to determine what affect the Patriot Act had on Swiss behavior. The Swiss
Money Laundering Act has been in force since 1998, three years prior to the passage of the
Patriot Act. Further, when observing the guidelines passed since 2001, the number of guidelines
passed by the Swiss Bankers Association did not appreciably increase immediately following the
passage of the Patriot Act, or even in the year or two after that. In fact, there exists a gap from
2001 to 2004 in passage of new regulations/" Under FINMA, there appears to have been even
less in the period following the passage of the Patriot Act--only one new ordinance passed in
2010.66
In 2008, the Swiss Bankers Association came out with a press release describing its new
due diligence agreement. The agreement took into account the FATF revised recommendations,
particularly the nine related to the financing of terrorism. These recommendations were
integrated into the agreement, which is revised every five years.67
The newest form of the Swiss due diligence agreement expanded the requirements of
identification of customers and, "lays down the obligations on banks with regard to client
identification and establishment of the identity of beneficial owner assets.6S" The process
described states that identification must be verified when opening accounts, entering into
fiduciary transactions, renting safe deposit boxes, management of third party assets, and
transactions involving over CHF 25,000. It specifies exactly how to establish identity with both
individuals and corporations. The language is simple, but direct and very specific. The document
attempts to cover various contingencies that may be encountered when dealing with the
administration of financial business. There is an auditing component to the agreement, conducted
with external auditors. Any problems are to be reported to the supervisory body under the Swiss
Banking federal commission. Any discrepancies between this agreement and practice can end in
a fine.69 The agreement "also takes a systematic risk-based approach, giving banks greater
freedom in their decision making. 70"
On the whole, the Swiss agreement is more comprehensive than the Patriot Act in its
descriptions and instructions on identifying and dealing with such administrative matters. Such
inclusiveness is particularly telling when one considers that the Swiss use U.S. definitions and
lists of suspected terrorists in their system. The difference appears when one looks to the
reporting aspects. This document does not specify reporting requirements for the government,
though this is because the document is not a legally binding document under the Swiss
government's auspices."
Based on the above evidence, it seems fair to state that the Patriot Act had little impact on
the Swiss banking operations or their regulatory bodies. This is most likely due to the fact that
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Switzerland and the Swiss banking system already had a comprehensive and enforced legal
system at work against money laundering. Any of the legislation passed by the United States
would not have greatly impacted the Swiss banking system because the system "has set up what
is probably the world's most comprehensive and effective mechanism for dealing with money
from criminal sources. 72"
Policy Recommendations
U.S. legislation has had minimal to no direct impact on the Swiss banking system in its fight
against terrorism. This stems from the fact that Switzerland already had a comprehensive system
in place to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Thus, the United States should not
be looking to legislate and enforce its codes in other states, particularly post-industrial states, like
Switzerland. Rather, it would behoove the United States to determine what has made an impact
and continue to work through those channels.
If United States legislation did not have a direct impact on the Swiss banking system,
FATF, an international organization, did. This bears the question: why? Further, why did the
Swiss Bankers Association wait until 2008 to implement recommendations first established in
2001?
To begin to answer these questions, it is important to recognize that the Swiss Bankers
Association agreement under consideration is only reviewed every five years. Yet, it would have
been possible for the Swiss Bankers Association to employ the recommendations when the
agreement was revised in 2003. Because the association waited an additional five years to
implement the recommendations suggests that there must have been a change in how the
recommendations were published or how the FA TF was perceived or both, between 2003 and
2008.
These conclusions give the United States two areas on which to work. First, the United
States should ascertain why Swiss corporations chose the FATF recommendations to implement.
Second, the United States should determine the change that persuaded the Swiss to integrate the
recommendation in 2008 as opposed to 2003. Only then can the United States begin to alter its
own policies to better accomplish its overall security goal of halting terrorist financing.
To begin, it is important to determine why the Swiss chose to implement the FATF
recommendations. FATF is an inter-governmental organization established in 1989. Its current
mission is "the development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.r'" The FATF has "34 member jurisdictions"
including the United States and Switzerland, "2 regional organizations" and 23 observers.i" That
FA TF is an intergovernmental organization must make it more appealing to Switzerland than
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being manipulated by another country's laws and regulations. This is most likely why the Swiss
Bankers Association eventually adopted its recommendations.
Another likely reason the Swiss Bankers Association
embraced the FATF
recommendations is the simplicity and directness with which the FA TF expressed its
recommendations.
The nine recommendations
published by the FA TF were special
recommendations on terrorist financing. The first recommendation proposed the "ratification and
implementation of UN instruments," particularly the 1999 United National International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism. Second, the FATF recommended that
states, "crimializ]e] the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering." Third, states
were advised to "freez]e] and confiscate[e] terrorist assets." Fourth, "reporting suspicious
transactions related to terrorism" was proposed. Fifth, states were encouraged to participate in,
"international cooperation" through treaties or other formal agreements, established for the
purposes of information exchange. States were also advised to avoid providing safe havens to
those who finance terrorism. The sixth recommendation addressed "alternative remittance."
States should register all those who deal with financial movements via FA TF registration
suggestions and prosecute anyone that attempts to participate in the market without proper
registration. Seventh, the FATF proposed that "wire transfers" have identification attached to
them, with such information remaining attached through all stages of multiple transfers. Eighth,
legal "non-profit organizations" deserve protection. Finally, the FA TF recommended that states
should be vigilant regarding the physical movement of cash by "cash couriers.75"
Such straight forward and broad recommendations and language made it easy to
incorporate the FA TF recommendations into an already existing document. Attempting to pass
U.S. legislation that would make it difficult for foreign corporations to financially interact with
the United States has clearly proven ineffective. And, given the current economic recession, the
United States can ill-afford to lose business in any of its major sectors, and this includes the
financial sector.
The United States will need to find other ways to prevent the financing of terrorism. The
United States cannot take complete control of an intergovernmental organization; it can find
ways to better work through such an organization. One such way would be through existing
national organizations such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). FinCEN
was established in 1990, "to provide a government-wide multi score financial intelligence and
analysis network. 76" In 1994, this agency took over regulatory responsibilities regarding the
Bank Secrecy Act. It was again given even more responsibilities under the Patriot Act. 77 While
FinCEN does affiliate with the FATF, as well as other international organizations, the United
States should work on strengthening its appeal and applicability worldwide.
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One way the United States has attempted to work through FinCEN already is via the
Egmont Group. Originally founded in 1995, the Egmont Group was designed to serve as a
communication network to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This organization
is made up of financial intelligence units, or small national agencies that work within their home
states. Today, the group has approximately 120 members.i"
The United States should work on better synergizing its efforts bringing together its
national organizations and the international organizations in which it is involved, and putting
forward a cohesive set of goals. These should be structured along the lines of the FATF which
appears to be the most successful organization at this time. Further, the United States should
promote policies that can be easily adapted to existing institutions, documents, and agreements
of individual countries, as the Swiss were able to do with the FATF recommendations.
Additionally, the United States should identify ways to further strengthen the existing
organizations such that they are better able to perform their intended function. For example, the
FA TF has an excellent report with its members, but it lacks any sort of enforcement mechanisms
if its members choose not to abide by its recommendations. Therefore, it would behoove the
United States, working in conjunction with other member states to strengthen the FATF and
better promote enforcement.
Conclusion
Due to its large market share and importance in the Swiss economy, it is not surprising that
Switzerland was ahead of the curve when it comes to anti-money laundering actions. In fact, one
might conclude that despite Switzerland's sometimes poor reputation, the United States probably
could learn a thing or two from the Swiss system. Switzerland's apparent disregard for direct
U.S. policy calls into question of the true influence and power of the United States. If the United
States assumed that it could pressure another developed state into immediate action by
threatening to close off significant aspects of the U.S. economy, it appears sadly mistaken. It
should not be concluded that the United States lacks the ability to sway another state in a given
direction. Rather, that the United States cannot or should not depend solely on its economic
power to do so.
Despite the apparent lack of direct U.S. influence on the banking system, the Swiss have
indirectly implemented several U.S. backed policies, as evidenced by the inclusion of the FATF
regulations. Given such action, it would be illuminating to further examine the factors explaining
the success of indirect policy methods over direct policy methods in the prevention of terrorist
financing. Findings in such a study may suggest a more comprehensive understanding of how the
United States can best exert its influence given its current characteristics.
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